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Abstract 
This thesis attempts to ask how the United States should conduct foreign policy towards 
Iran given the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), agreed to on 14 June 2015. 
The 2015 JCPOA initiated a drastic shift in US foreign policy toward Iran. It is now up to 
US policy makers to craft a coherent Iran foreign policy moving forward from the 
agreement. In order to accomplish this, the vitriolic relationship between Iran and the 
United States, which contains two concurrent narratives, must be examined. The dual 
narratives are the history of the successive US Presidential administrations’ relations with 
Iran, and the history of Iran’s nuclear development and resulting UN sanctions.  
This thesis asserts that policy makers must craft a workable foreign policy, and the 
terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action must be highlighted and executed. 
Additionally, Iran’s history of failing to uphold agreements must be acknowledged, as its 
history of duplicitous actions indicates their likely future course. This paper will rehearse 
Iran’s longstanding involvement in global terrorism to argue that the JCPOA must be 
strictly followed. This historical background and the details of the current agreement form 
the foundation for constructing a coherent foreign policy regarding Iran. 
With the groundwork laid, three different policy alternatives are evaluated. The first 
is an optimistic acceptance of the JCPOA, second is a total rejection of the JCPOA, and 
third is a cautious acceptance of the JCPOA with additional supplemental verification. The 
policy of optimism regarding the agreement is rejected due to its failure to take into 
consideration the realities of the threats posed by Iran. Additionally, the recommendations 
of some to jettison the JCPOA and continue with the status quo are also evaluated and 
rejected due to implementation issues and negligible international support. Finally, this 
thesis proposes a policy that distrusts Iran, proactively verifies Iran’s compliance, and 
supports US allies in the region. Seven specific steps are proposed to implement this 
recommendation, forming the policy most likely to achieve the objective of securing lasting 
peace, both with Iran and with the Middle East as a whole.  
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In Search of Peace:  
Restructuring the US-Iran Relationship in Light of the  
2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
On July 14, 2015, the E3/EU+31  and Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA), ushering in a drastically new direction in US policy towards Iran. The 
agreement tries to ensure that Iran will not produce any nuclear weapons, while 
simultaneously allowing them to develop peaceful nuclear technology. The JCPOA 
consists of the main text of the deal, which is surprisingly short, and five extensive annexes 
covering the various specifics of the agreement in detail. Annex I contains the specifics of 
the nuclear aspects of the deal and Annex II lists the various sanctions that will be removed 
in the course of implementation. Annex III and IV cover the civil nuclear cooperation the 
agreement calls for and specify the Joint Committee that will be created in order to 
implement the JCPOA respectively. Finally, Annex V lays out the timeline for 
implementation of the agreement, specifically the details contained in Annexes I and II.   
The JCPOA, if fully enacted, lifts most of the current economic sanctions against 
Iran, and provides the greatest opportunity in thirty-five years to chart a new direction in 
the US-Iran relationship. However, the fact that the JCPOA was signed does not negate 
nearly four decades of hostility between the United States and Iran, and that history cannot 
be ignored. Therefore, the question facing US policy-makers today is how to advance the 
US-Iran relationship in light of the agreement. 
 Given the long and vitriolic history between the United States and Iran, an 
immediate reconciliation is highly unlikely. Additionally, the national character that Iran 
has demonstrated over the past three and a half decades poses foreign policy risks the 
United States can ill-afford to ignore. The United States should not just attempt to secure 
a peaceful relationship with Iran, but for peace in the Middle East as a whole, which in part 
is destabilized by Iran. Therefore, the best policy the United States can adopt toward Iran 
consists of a very careful distrust, a proactive verification of Iran’s compliance with their 
international agreements, and support for US allies in the region. 
                                                 
1 The E3/EU+3 consists of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and 
Germany. This group is also frequently referred to in the United States as the P5+1. 
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The US-Iran Relationship Historically 
History of US-Iran Relations: Pre-Revolution to President Obama’s Administration 
The 2015 JCPOA represents the Obama administration’s attempts to secure a 
satisfactory peace with Iran that resolves the longstanding issue of Iran’s nuclear weapons 
capability. Like the five presidents before him, President Obama has wrestled with the 
Iranian problem, and proposed the JCPOA as the solution. However, now that the JCPOA 
has been signed, how to move forward with the US-Iran relationship beyond the bounds of 
agreement is much less clear. The history of the United States’ complicated relationship 
with Iran must be explored in order to formulate an effective foreign policy given the 
JCPOA. 
Pre-Iranian Revolution. The United States and Iran first established full 
diplomatic relations in 1883 while Iran was still known as the Kingdom of Persia.2 At the 
conclusion of World War II, the General Secretary of the USSR, Joseph Stalin, considered 
breaching the USSR’s agreement with Britain and Iran, as he had originally agreed to 
withdraw all Soviet troops from Iran. However, later he wanted to maintain a troop 
presence in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan to secure Iranian oil, as well as to create a 
buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the West.  He also contemplated outright 
annexation of the province to achieve those goals. President Truman’s unexpected support 
for Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi motivated the Soviet Union to follow their agreements 
and withdraw their troops in late 1946, and consequently boosted the Iranian perception of 
the United States considerably.3  
In 1953, the United States supported a coup d’état that overthrew the democratically 
elected prime minister and returned the Shah to power.4 While US involvement in the coup 
d’état did not initially damage US-Iran relations, it came to be seen “as a sea change in 
American conduct—from munificent protector of smaller countries to archetypal great 
                                                 
2 U.S. Department of State Historian, “A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, 
Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, Since 1776: Iran,” U.S. Department of State Office of the 
Historian, accessed 25 August 2015, http://history.state.gov/countries/iran. 
3 Malcolm Byrne, “Iran and the United States in the Cold War,” The Gilder Lehrman Institute of 
American History, accessed 25 August 2015, https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/age-
reagan/essays/iran-and-united-states-cold-war. 
4 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Iran,” U.S. Department of State, 10 March 2015, 
accessed 25 August 2015, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm. 
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power pursuing its own interests regardless of the wishes of local populations.”5 During 
the Cold War, the United States provided extensive military and political support to the 
Shah in an effort to counter Communism. US policy of “anyone but the Soviets” 
predisposed successive presidential administrations to support the government of the Shah, 
despite his descent into dictatorship.6  
The Iranian perception that the Shah was an American puppet contributed to his 
decreasing popularity,7 and public discontent against the Shah spilled out into the streets 
in the form of mass protests in December of 1978. The Shah fled Iran in January of 1979, 
and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned from exile on 1 February. Ten days later, he 
assumed power of the new government.8 
The Islamic Revolution and the Carter administration (1977-1981). The 
Islamic Revolution of 1979 was a watershed moment for Iran, and for the entire Middle 
East. Within fourteen months following the revolution, Iran abandoned old alliances and 
established relations with former enemies. Syria and Iran reversed diplomatic course and 
became firm allies, and Iran severed diplomatic relations with Egypt and Israel. Eventually, 
the United States also cut off diplomatic relations with Iran.9 
Initially, the United States continued to maintain an embassy in Iran and work with 
the new government. President Carter sought to walk the fine line between supporting a 
longtime US ally, the deposed Shah, and developing a working diplomatic relationship 
with Tehran. Some progress was made during the summer of 1979 with the more moderate 
provisional government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim 
Yazdi.10 That progress quickly unraveled with President Carter’s decision on 22 October 
                                                 
5 Byrne, “Iran and the United States in the Cold War.” 
6 Ibid. According to Byrne, “Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson did press the Shah 
repeatedly to enact reforms, but that strategy effectively ended with the assertion of the Nixon Doctrine in 
1969. Reflecting the heavy strain on American military resources caused by the Vietnam War, the new 
doctrine relied on regional powers to act as the first line of defense against potential Soviet expansionism. 
For the next several years, the Shah not only gained access to sophisticated American weaponry he had long 
coveted, but also obtained tacit White House permission to forgo any serious effort at reform.”  
7 Scott Savitz, Ph.D., “Reflections on the Revolution in Iran,” American Diplomacy, September 
2009, accessed 26 August 2015,  
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2009/0709/comm/savitz_reflections.html. 
8 Gary Sick, “The Carter Administration,” in The Iran Primer, ed. Robin Wright (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 129. 
9 Semira N. Nikou, “Timeline of Iran's Foreign Relations,” in The Iran Primer, ed. Robin Wright 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 231. 
10 Sick, “The Carter Administration.” 
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1979 to allow the Shah to enter the United States for life-saving medical treatment; a 
reluctant decision driven by the advice of his counselors in Washington in spite of the 
judgment of the embassy staff in Tehran.11 This decision infuriated the Iranian people, who 
interpreted it as signaling a US desire to return the Shah to power. Less than two weeks 
later, on 4 November 1979, university students overwhelmed the security at the US 
Embassy in Tehran and took the staff hostage, resulting in the 1979 hostage crisis. 
 Instead of condemning the attack, Ayatollah Khomeini actively supported it, and 
dismissed the Bazargan government. Khomeini’s political decision to support the students 
was due to internal opposition against the style of theocracy that he and the clerics were 
attempting to introduce. Many of the Shah’s opponents were unenthusiastic about replacing 
a monarchy with a theocracy, and support for Khomeini was wavering. By backing the 
embassy takeover, Khomeini shifted the focus away from the proposed government onto 
the Iranian struggle against “the Great Satan.” This strategic move stabilized his popular 
and political support in Iran, ensured that the new constitution would be adopted, and ended 
all hope of a working relationship with the United States.12 
For the next 444 days, the Americans were held hostage in the US Embassy in 
Tehran, prompting President Carter to cut off diplomatic relations with Iran and freeze an 
estimated six billion dollars of Iranian assets tied to US financial institutions.13 Though the 
hostage crisis was finally resolved on President Reagan’s inauguration day with the release 
of the embassy staff, US relations with Iran continued to sour. This led the Reagan 
Administration to place Iran on the State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list on 
19 January 1984, where it has remained ever since.14 
The Reagan administration (1981-1989). The primary focus of the Reagan 
Administration was defeating communism and confronting the USSR, reducing the status 
of the Iran situation. According to Geoffrey Kemp, a member of the National Security 
Council during Reagan’s first term, “the Reagan administration went through four stages—
indifference, hostility, cooperation and finally confrontation that even included some 
                                                 
11 William J. Daughtery, “Jimmy Carter and the 1979 Decision to Admit the Shah into the United 
States,” American Diplomacy, April 2003, accessed 26 August 2015,  
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_01-03/dauherty_shah/dauherty_shah.html. 
12 Sick, “The Carter Administration.” 
13 Nikou, “Timeline of Iran's Foreign Relations.”  
14 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Iran.” 
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limited combat.”15 During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the United States supported 
Iraq’s attempts to contain Iran, even protecting Iraqi oil targeted by the Iranians. The 
Ayatollah was pressured into accepting a cease-fire, due in part to US military intervention, 
and the Iran-Iraq war ended 20 August 1988. The Ayatollah considered the cease-fire 
deeply unsatisfactory, and remarked that accepting it was like drinking poison.16 
 The George H. W. Bush administration (1989-1993). President George H. W. 
Bush became president during the breakup of the USSR, one of the greatest international 
changes since the Second World War. As with President Reagan, President Bush was 
focused on ending communism as opposed to dealing with events in the Middle East.17 It 
was widely believed that Iran and Iraq would spend considerable time rebuilding their 
shattered countries after eight years of devastating, brutal war, and thus pose very little risk 
internationally.18 Unfortunately, this view proved inaccurate, as Iran continued to spread 
terrorism and the Islamic Revolution throughout the entire region. In the end, the US-Iran 
relationship remained unchanged during Bush’s presidency.  
The Clinton administration (1993-2001). When President Clinton assumed office 
in 1993, he expressed willingness to work with Iran to repair the relationship; however, he 
was hampered by several layers of sanctions, sharply opposing goals for the Middle East, 
strong distrust and animosity prevalent in both countries, and a history of Iran’s support 
for terrorism. Nevertheless, throughout his terms in office, President Clinton repeatedly 
tried to improve the relationship, even attempting to relax some of the sanctions.19 
Additionally, in 2000, Secretary of State Madeline Albright met a major Iranian demand 
by formally apologizing for the US’s role in the 1953 coup d’état that returned the Shah to 
power.20 However, essentially all of the Clinton Administration’s efforts were ultimately 
rejected by the Iranians, and President Clinton left office with the US-Iran relationship 
largely unchanged.  
                                                 
15 Geoffrey Kemp, “The Reagan Administration,” in The Iran Primer, ed. Robin Wright 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 133. 
16 Ibid, 135. 
17 Richard N. Haass, “The George H.W. Bush Administration,” in The Iran Primer, ed. Robin 
Wright (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 136. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Bruce O. Riedel, “The Clinton Administration,” in The Iran Primer, ed. Robin Wright 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 141. 
20 Ibid. 141. 
IN SEARCH OF PEACE  11 
 
 The George W. Bush administration (2001-2009). The first signs of hope for 
meaningful progress came in the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York City on 11 
September 2001. After the United States toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan, Iran, who had 
long supported the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, helped the United States in efforts to 
construct a new government. In fact, their support was crucial in persuading opposition 
forces to agree to the US-backed choice for president, Hamid Karzai.21 After Saddam 
Hussein was deposed from Iraq by US forces, Iran once again looked to cooperate with the 
United States to ensure stability in Iraq. The United States and Iran even conducted two 
ambassadorial level meetings in 2004.22  
 Unfortunately, these signs of possible rapprochement quickly faded into the 
background of continued distrust and antagonism between the two countries. President 
George W. Bush continued to oppose the Iranian government internationally, even 
excoriating Iran in his 2002 State of the Union address. After stating that a major US goal 
was to “prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and 
allies with weapons of mass destruction,”23 the President specifically implicated North 
Korea, Iran, and Iraq as those regimes, labeling them “an axis of evil”:24 “Iran aggressively 
pursues these weapons and exports terror,” he said, “while an unelected few repress the 
Iranian people’s hope for freedom.”25 His strongly worded rebuke of Iran, and his use of 
the term “axis of evil,” proved detrimental to the fragile détente with Iran.  
 Coming on the heels of the Clinton administration’s apology and the increased 
cooperation on Afghanistan, the Bush administration’s inclusion of Iran as a member of 
the “axis of evil” was seen as a betrayal of trust and good will.26 Further, President Bush’s 
                                                 
21 Stephen J. Hadley, “The George W. Bush Administration,” in The Iran Primer, ed. Robin Wright 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 143. 
22 Ibid, 143. 
23 George W. Bush, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” The White House Archives, 
29 January 2002, accessed 27 August 2015,   
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham, “What the Axis of Evil Metaphor did to Iran,” 
Middle East Journal, Volume 61, No. 3, 2007: 434, accessed 7 September 2015, 
http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/gmbonham/Iran.pdf.  
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statements unintentionally proved politically advantageous for the ultra-conservatives in 
Iran. According to an anonymous member of the Iranian opposition:27 
the speech was perceived as an insult to the values of the Iranian people and for that 
reason caused the Iranians to rally around the religious values. This reaction 
strengthened the conservative groups. The mobilization of religious and 
conservative ideas was strengthened by the fact that Bush’s speech came right 
before our celebration of the 23rd anniversary of the Islamic Revolution . . . this 
benefited the conservative forces in society.28 
Thus, while the Bush administration made definite progress towards a normalization of 
relations with Iran, they inadvertently erected significant roadblocks.  
 The Obama administration (2009-present). During his campaign and subsequent 
terms as president, Barack Obama prioritized the repairing of US relationships with the 
Arab world, and especially Iran.29 However, his efforts have been largely unsuccessful, 
because the relations between the two nations have become inseparably tied to the status 
of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s nuclear program, the resulting sanctions, and the recent 
negotiations, form a second narrative necessary to understand the 2015 JCPOA and its 
implications.  
History of Iran’s Nuclear Development 
Iran first started developing nuclear technology back in 1957, under the direction 
of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, with the assistance of the United States through the 
Atoms for Peace program.30 On 1 July 1968, Iran was one of the original ratifying members 
of the UN Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),31 which allows for 
the use of nuclear technology solely for peaceful purposes, forbids any efforts to develop 
                                                 
27 Due to the method used for the interviews, all recorded responses were anonymous. However, a 
detailed list of the individuals interviewed can be found in the appendix of the paper by Messrs. Heradstveit 
and Bonham, from which the following quote is taken.   
28 Ibid. 434-435. 
29 John Limbert, “The Obama Administration,” in The Iran Primer, ed. Robin Wright (Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 146. During 2009 and 2010, President Obama wrote two 
letters to the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as well as received two letters from then-
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 
30 David Albright and Andrea Stricker, “Iran's Nuclear Program,” in The Iran Primer, ed. Robin 
Wright (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 77. 
31 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Iran (Islamic Republic of): Ratification of 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” United Nations Office for Disarmament 
Affairs, accessed 27 August 2015,   
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/npt/iran%28islamicrepublicof%29/rat/washington. 
IN SEARCH OF PEACE  13 
 
or transfer nuclear weapons, and mandates adherence to the stipulated safeguards.32 
Nevertheless, Iran tried to keep the door open to pursue nuclear weapons. 
Progress in the 1970s. During the 1970s, the Shah pushed for Iran’s full control of 
the entire nuclear cycle, an important prerequisite towards the development of nuclear 
weapons. According to Akbar Etemad, the Shah’s chief atomic energy adviser and the head 
of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) from 1974 to 1978, the Shah did not 
pursue the development of nuclear weapons because of the strength of Iran’s military. 
However, Mr. Etemad indicated that, had the Shah remained in power, Iran would likely 
have developed nuclear weapons in response to the nuclear technology of Pakistan, India, 
and Israel.33  
During the early 1970s, Iran’s policy toward nuclear weapons was to keep the 
option of acquiring them available. That all changed, however, with the Islamic Revolution 
of 1979 and the newly established Iranian government led by Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Initially, the Ayatollah was personally opposed to nuclear technology, and halted all 
nuclear development. In addition, severed relationships with the West, especially with the 
United States, left Iran’s joint nuclear projects with western nations uncompleted.34 
However, the Ayatollah changed his mind regarding nuclear weapons with the advent of 
the Iran-Iraq war, which convinced him to not only restart the nation’s nuclear technology, 
but to explore nuclear weapons as a deterrent to further Arab aggression.35 
Iran’s secret developments. Due to suspicion of the West, and fractured relations 
after the Revolution, Iran turned to other nations to procure nuclear technology and 
materials. By the early 1990s, it had looked to China, India, Argentina, Pakistan, and 
Germany for assistance.36 Iran would come to acquire a significant amount of nuclear 
technology from Pakistan in 1987, and signed a major nuclear cooperation agreement with 
                                                 
32 See specifically Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.  
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT),” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, accessed 27 August 2015, 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml.  
33 Maziar Bahari, ““The Shah's Plan was to Build Bombs”,” New Statesman, 11 September 2008, 
accessed 27 August 2015, http://www.newstatesman.com/asia/2008/09/iran-nuclear-shah-west. 
34 David Albright and Andrea Stricker, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 78.  
35 Ibid, 78. 
36 Elaine Sciolino, “Report Says Iran Seeks Atomic Arms,” New York Times, 31 October 1991, 
accessed 28 August 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/31/world/report-says-iran-seeks-atomic-
arms.html. 
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China in 1990.37 Between 1994 and 1996, Iran procured more technology from Pakistan 
and began working with Russia to rebuild one of the reactors at Bushehr that had been 
damaged during the Iran-Iraq war.38 
 While the international community was aware of Iran’s attempts to develop nuclear 
technology, the extent of their progress was unknown until the National Council of 
Resistance of Iran revealed Iran’s secret nuclear program. In an August 2002 press 
conference, the Council announced the existence of secret nuclear facilities at Natanz and 
Arak,39 subsequently confirmed by the Institute for Science and International Security on 
12 December 2002.40 These revelations placed Iran’s nuclear program under intense 
international scrutiny, which led to a series of further disconcerting discoveries. 
 According to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports, Iran secretly 
imported uranium in 1991 and uranium metal in 1994, produced multiple types of enriched 
uranium from depleted or natural uranium,41 transferred nuclear materials between sites for 
further processing, conducted secret nuclear tests in 1999 and 2002, developed an extensive 
laser spectroscopy laboratory for a laser enrichment program, and developed small 
amounts of low enriched uranium (LEU) from both their centrifuge and laser enrichment 
processes.42 Iran’s neglect to notify the IAEA of any of these nuclear developments 
constituted a violation of Iran’s agreement with the IAEA.43 In his 6 June 2003 report to 
                                                 
37 David Albright and Andrea Stricker, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 78. 
38 Ibid, 79. 
39 National Council of Resistance of Iran, “Iran-Nuclear: Secret Nuclear Site in Isfahan Region,” 
National Council of Resistance of Iran, 7 October 2003, accessed 28 August 2015, http://www.ncr-
iran.org/en/news/nuclear/560-iran-nuclear-secret-nuclear-site-in-isfahan-region. 
40 “Satellite images of two sites in Iran show the construction of secret nuclear fuel cycle facilities, 
according to ISIS assessments and confidential sources. This information was confirmed by CNN and 
reported on December 12, 2002. The facilities in the two satellite images appear related to the production of 
enriched uranium and heavy water, two materials that may be used in a civil nuclear program or in the 
production of nuclear weapons.” See David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Iran Building Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Facilities: International Transparency Needed,” Institute for Science and International Security, 12 
December 2002, accessed 28 August 2015, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/iran-building-nuclear-
fuel-cycle-facilities-international-transparency-need/8. 
41 Iran produced UO2 (uranium dioxide), UO3 (uranium trioxide), UF4 (uranium tetrafluoride), UF6 
(uranium hexafluoride) and AUC (ammonium uranium carbonate) from imported depleted UO2, depleted 
U3O8 (triuranium octoxide), and natural U3O8. See IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” International Atomic Energy Association, 10 November 2003, 
accessed 28 August 2015, 9, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2003-75.pdf. 
42 Ibid. 
43 IAEA, “Implementation of the safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 
International Atomic Energy Association, 6 June  2003, accessed 28 August 2015, 1, 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2003-40.pdf. 
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the IAEA Board of Governors, Director General Mohamed ElBaradei bluntly stated, “Iran 
has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the 
reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the 
declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed.”44 These disturbing 
revelations caused significant international doubt as to Iran’s intentions to uphold the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. 
 The IAEA spent the next two years attempting to bring Iran into cooperation with 
the Safeguards Agreement, but ultimately failed. The IAEA passed seven separate 
resolutions, trying to return Iran to compliance, between 12 September 2003 and 11 August 
2005, but Iran refused.  
The period of non-compliance. On 24 September 2005, the IAEA voted twenty-
two to one, with twelve abstentions, to find Iran in a state of non-compliance.45 The 
resolution stated “that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with 
its NPT Safeguards Agreement . . . constitute non compliance.”46 This opened the 
possibility of referring Iran to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions. The report 
continued to say that: 
the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director 
General’s report, the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course 
of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 
and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is 
exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the 
competence of the Security Council.47 
Despite the IAEA’s efforts, Iran refused to comply with the Safeguards Agreement 
and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. On 4 February 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors 
passed a resolution calling on the IAEA Director General to refer Iran to the UN Security 
Council.48  
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Michael Adler, “Iran and the IAEA,” in The Iran Primer, ed. Robin Wright (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 91.   
46 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005,” The International Atomic Energy Association, 24 September 
2005, accessed 28 August 2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2005-77.pdf. 
47 Ibid. 
48 IAEA, “IAEA and Iran: Chronicle of Key Events,” International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed 
28 August 2015, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/chronology-of-key-events. 
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Iran at the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council passed the first 
resolution regarding Iran’s nuclear program, U.N.S.C. Resolution 1696, on 31 July 2006. 
The resolution gave Iran a one-month time-frame to cease all uranium enrichment and 
reprocessing; it contained no sanctions, but instead threatened additional actions should 
Iran remain in non-compliance.49 After Iran refused to satisfy Resolution 1696, on 23 
December 2006, the Security Council passed U.N.S.C. Resolution 1737, which instructed 
U.N. member states “to prevent the supply, sale or transfer . . . of all items, materials, 
equipment, goods and technology [to Iran],” which could assist in their nuclear program or 
their weapons delivery systems.50 The resolution also froze the assets of twenty-two 
corporations and individuals connected to Iran’s nuclear or weapons programs. 
Nevertheless, Iran refused to respect the Security Council demands, leading to the 
unanimously passed U.N.S.C. Resolution 1747 on 14 March 2007.51  
 U.N.S.C. Resolution 1747 strengthened previous resolutions and imposed new 
sanctions on Iran. In response, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, stated that 
the Council was “being abused to take an unlawful, unnecessary and unjustifiable action 
against the peaceful nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which presents no 
threat to international peace and security and falls, therefore, outside the Council’s Charter-
based mandate.”52 Once again, Iran largely rejected the ultimatums, and on 3 March 2008 
the  Security Council passed U.N.S.C. Resolution 1803, further tightening sanctions in an 
effort to convince Iran to yield to the international community’s stipulations regarding the 
Iranian nuclear program.53 Later that year, on 28 September 2008, the Security Council 
passed U.N.S.C. Resolution 1835, which reaffirmed the previous resolutions, but added no 
new sanctions.54  
                                                 
49 Jason Starr, “The U.N. Resolutions,” in The Iran Primer, ed. Robin Wright (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 119. 
50 IAEA, “Resolution 1737 (2006).” International Atomic Energy Agency, 23 December 2006, 
accessed 28 August 2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf. 
51 United Nations, “SECURITY COUNCIL TOUGHENS SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, ADDS 
ARMS EMBARGO, WITH UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION 1747 (2007),” United Nations, 
27 March 2007, accessed 28 August 2015, http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc8980.doc.htm. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Starr, “The U.N. Resolutions,” 120. 
54 Ibid, 121. 
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The final set of UN sanctions came on 9 June 2010 when U.N.S.C. Resolution 1929 
was passed,55 partially due to the 2009 revelation that Iran had secretly built another 
uranium enrichment facility. The Council noted “with serious concern that Iran has 
constructed an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all 
enrichment-related activities, and that Iran failed to notify it to the IAEA until September 
2009, which is inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Agreements to its 
Safeguards Agreement.” In addition, the Council indicated that Iran had enriched uranium 
to twenty percent without notifying the IAEA, as it was required to do.56 Altogether, the 
six resolutions sanctioned a total of seventy-five Iranian organizations and forty-one 
individuals, all of whom were connected to either Iran’s nuclear program or its weapons 
development programs.57 
The E3/EU+3 negotiations with Iran. The next major development in the US-Iran 
relationship came in November of 2013 when the E3/EU+3 and Iran signed an interim 
agreement known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). Western nations and Iran had been 
negotiating with little success since 2003,58 but in 2013, they achieved a breakthrough. Iran 
agreed to halt production at the Arak site and to deplete much of its enriched uranium in 
exchange for partial sanction relief and release of frozen assets.59 In addition, Iran also 
reaffirmed that it would never seek nuclear weapons, and would allow enhanced 
monitoring by the IAEA.60  
The JPOA also stipulated a six-month period for the next stage of negotiations, 
extendable by the mutual agreement of all parties.61 The JPOA signified a significant 
change in the E3/EU+3 negotiations with Iran, and was interpreted as a major step toward 
a peaceful resolution of Iran’s nuclear situation. The six-month time frame to complete 
final negotiations proved too optimistic, and the negotiations were extended in July of 
                                                 
55 IAEA, “Resolution 1929 (2010),” International Atomic Energy Agency, 9 June 2010, accessed 29 
August 2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1929-2010.pdf. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Starr, “The U.N. Resolutions,” 121. 
58 Albright and Stricker, “Iran's Nuclear Program,” 79. 
59 Ibid. 
60 EEAS, “Joint Plan of Action,” European External Action Service, 24 November 2013, accessed 
29 August 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf. 
61 Ibid. 
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2014, and again in November of 2014.62 Even with these setbacks, however, the 
negotiations continued making slow progress. 
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. On 2 April 2015, the E3/EU+3 and 
Iran issued a joint statement announcing that a deal had been struck. The April agreement 
consisted of a framework that the final Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 
would follow and gave the E3/EU+3 and Iran until 30 June to complete it. Once finalized, 
the JCPOA would be submitted to the UN Security Council for approval, at which point 
all the previous resolutions and sanctions against Iran would be lifted.63 
 Once again, the 30 June deadline proved too optimistic, and the negotiations 
dragged on. However, on 14 July 2015, the E3/EU+3 and Iran shocked the world and 
announced that they had succeeded in finalizing the JCPOA. In their joint statement, EU 
High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif 
proclaimed that “with courage, political will, mutual respect and leadership, we delivered 
on what the world was hoping for: a shared commitment to peace and to join hands in order 
to make our world safer. This is an historic day also because we are creating the conditions 
for building trust and opening a new chapter in our relationship.”64 They went on to say 
that “we have successfully concluded negotiations and resolved a dispute that lasted more 
than 10 years.”65 The JCPOA provided what many saw to be the foundation for a new 
relationship between the United States and Iran. 
 The reaction to the JCPOA in the United States was swift and polarized. President 
Barak Obama immediately released a statement praising the agreement: “Today, after two 
years of negotiations, the United States, together with our international partners, has 
achieved something that decades of animosity has not -- a comprehensive, long-term deal 
                                                 
62 EEAS, “The EU's Relations with Iran,” European External Action Service, accessed 29 August 
2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/iran/index_en.htm. 
63 Federica Mogherini and Javad Zarif, “Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica 
Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif Switzerland” European External Action Service, 2 April 
2015, accessed 29 August 2015, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150402_03_en.htm. 
64 Federica Mogherini and Javad Zarif, “Joint statement by EU High Representative Federica 
Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif Vienna, 14 July 2015,” European External Action 
Service, 14 July 2015, accessed 29 August 2015, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements-
eeas/2015/150714_01_en.htm. 
65 Ibid. 
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with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon.”66 He went on to assert the 
following:  
This deal meets every single one of the bottom lines that we established when we 
achieved a framework earlier this spring.  Every pathway to a nuclear weapon is 
cut off.  And the inspection and transparency regime necessary to verify that 
objective will be put in place.  Because of this deal, Iran will not produce the highly 
enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium that form the raw materials 
necessary for a nuclear bomb.67 
Additionally, President Obama went on to state that there was no viable alternative to the 
deal outside of all-out war. President Obama said “we have to be honest.  Congressional 
rejection of this deal leaves any U.S. administration that is absolutely committed to 
preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon with one option -- another war in the Middle 
East.”68 His sentiments on the JCPOA were not shared by many individuals in US politics, 
however.  
 Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) said the “deal undermines our national security. 
President Obama has consistently negotiated from a position of weakness, giving 
concession after concession to a regime that has American blood on its hands, holds 
Americans hostage, and has consistently violated every agreement it ever signed.”69 
Senator Rubio promised to vote against the agreement when it came up for review in the 
Senate. Governor Scott Walker (R-WI) said that the “nuclear agreement with Iran will be 
remembered as one of America’s worst diplomatic failures,”70 claiming further that 
“instead of making the world safer, this deal will likely lead to a nuclear arms race in the 
world’s most dangerous region.”71 Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY), while using much less 
                                                 
66 Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on Iran,” The White House, 14 July 2015, accessed 
29 August 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/statement-president-iran. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The White House, 5 August 
2015, accessed 26 October 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-
president-iran-nuclear-deal. 
69 Marco Rubio, “Marco Rubio Statement on Obama’s Dangerous Iran Deal,” Marco Rubio, 
accessed 29 August 2015, https://marcorubio.com/news/marco-rubio-statement-on-obamas-dangerous-iran-
deal/.  
70 Scott Walker, “Governor Walker Statement on Iran Nuclear Deal,” Walker 16, 14 July 2015, 
accessed 29 August 2015, https://www.scottwalker.com/news/governor-walker-statement-iranian-nuclear-
deal. 
71 Ibid. 
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inflammatory rhetoric in his statement, also voiced disapproval of the deal and vowed to 
vote against it.72  
When the deal was presented to Congress, fifty-eight senators and 269 members of 
the House of Representatives voted against its adoption.73 Ultimately, however, the deal 
survived Congressional review, as opponents in the Senate could not secure enough votes 
for cloture to bring a bill of disapproval to the Senate floor. Even if Congress had managed 
to send a bill of disapproval to the President, he vowed to veto it. Since the Senate lacked 
the necessary numbers override his veto, the bill passed “through the backdoor” as it 
were.74 The question facing policy makers today is how to proceed now that the JCPOA is 
in force internationally.  
                                                 
72 Charles E. Schumer, “My Position on the Iran Deal,” Charles E. Schumer, 8 August 2015, 
accessed 29 August 2015, http://www.schumer.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/my-position-on-the-
iran-deal. 
73 United States Senate, “U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 114th Congress - 1st Session,” United States 
Senate, 10 September 2015, accessed 2 October 2015,  
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=114&session=1&vo
te=00264; Clerk of the House, “FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 493,” Office of the Clerk U.S. 
House of Representatives, 11 September 2015, accessed 2 October 2015,  
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2015/roll493.xml.  
74 Facing intense Congressional opposition to the negotiations, President Obama announced his 
intention to declare the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action a nonbinding executive agreement, which does 
not need Congressional approval and cannot be altered by Congress. However, many Republicans countered 
that the JCPOA should actually be a treaty, which requires the approval of a two-thirds majority in the Senate 
to ratify, but President Obama stood his ground. Congress was faced with the choice of doing nothing, or 
attempting to pass legislation that would force President Obama to abide by a Congressional review. 
Congress chose the latter, and Senator Corker introduced the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 
(INARA).  
The act passed with a vote of 98-1 in the Senate and 400-25 in the House, and was signed by 
President Obama on May 22. He had originally threatened to veto the bill, but signed it upon realizing that a 
veto override was virtually guaranteed. Unfortunately, in an attempt to make the bill as broadly acceptable 
as possible, Senator Corker essentially ensured the bill’s eventual failure at stopping ratification of the 
JCPOA. Instead of mandating the constitutionally required two-thirds majority of the Senate to vote in favor 
of the JCPOA, the INARA dictated a different approval process. The act gave Congress the option do one of 
three things: pass a bill approving the deal, pass a bill to disapprove it, or do nothing leading to approval by 
default.  
However, since Congress’s decision of disapproval would be a piece of legislation, President Obama 
could still veto it, which he promised to do. This created a situation where the only way Congress could 
successfully pass a resolution of disapproval would be to have sufficient votes to override President Obama’s 
promised veto, which requires a two-thirds majority in the House and Senate. This meant that the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act essentially took the approval requirement of 67 senators voting in approval, and 
reduced it to only 34 refusing to override a veto. While the INARA successfully forced President Obama to 
submit the JCPOA to Congress for review, it created a nearly impossible course for Congress to navigate in 
attempting to reject it. See Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Public Law 114-17, 114th Cong., 
1st sess. (22 May 2015); United States Institute for Peace, “Congress Acts: Senate, House Pass Corker Bill,” 
The Iran Primer, May 14, 2015, accessed October 9, 2015,  
http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2015/may/14/congress-acts-senate-house-pass-corker-bill. 
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The US-Iran Relationship Under the JCPOA 
Before any forward-looking policies can be discussed, however, several aspects of 
the JCPOA must be considered. First, what did the United States and Iran agree to under 
the JCPOA? More importantly, what was not addressed? These must be thoroughly 
examined before a policy can be constructed. Second, what of the non-nuclear aspects of 
the US-Iran relationship; areas unaffected by the JCPOA, but which constitute a significant 
portion of the difficulties between the United States and Iran? In addition, what is the 
character of the nation of Iran relative to past behavior and expected future actions? Finally, 
does Iran even desire peace? As Senator Schumer asked, do they only seek sanction relief, 
and not a restoration of diplomatic relations?75 The motivations of Iran, both regarding the 
JCPOA and in all non-nuclear arenas, directly affect how the United States should craft 
policy towards Iran.  
Breaking Down the Agreement 
 Under the JCPOA, the United States has agreed to accomplish and complete 
specific obligations. Though solving the nuclear issue is only one part of a series of 
problems between the United States and Iran, it is the least flexible under the JCPOA. The 
framework of the JCPOA therefore forms a permanent foundation for the future US-Iran 
relations.  
 The US agreements under the JCPOA. The terms of the agreement dictate the 
timeline for enacting the various actions. According to Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr, 
writing for the Congressional Research Service, the United States has agreed to the 
following upon Implementation Day:76  
 ease the sanctions that have frozen approximately $100 to $125 billion in Iranian 
revenue overseas in the United States and Europe 
 stop enforcing sanctions against Iran’s oil industry 
                                                 
75 Schumer, “My Position on the Iran Deal.” 
76 “‘Implementation Day’ arrives when the IAEA determines and verifies that Iran has met the 
requirements laid out in ‘Annex V – Implementation Plan’ of the JCPOA, para. 15, which summarizes 
requirements relating to Iran’s nuclear program stated in more detail in ‘Annex I – Nuclear-related 
Measures.’” See Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr, “Iran Nuclear Agreement: Selected Issues for 
Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 6 August 2015, accessed 31 August 2015, 
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/pqpresultpage.gispdfhitspanel.pdflink/$2fapp-
bin$2fgis-congresearch$2f9$2ff$2f2$2fe$2fcrs-2015-fdt-
0562_from_1_to_34.pdf/entitlementkeys=1234|app-gis|congresearch|crs-2015-fdt-0562. 
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 stop enforcing sanctions against the Iranian banking industry77 
 remove selected individuals and companies from the Specially Designated 
Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders 
List, and the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List78  
 allow the sale of commercial passenger airplanes and parts to Iran 
 allow the import of Iranian foods and products such as caviar and rugs 
 actively encourage the adoption of the JCPOA, or JCPOA influenced policy at the 
state and local level79 
The implications of these actions are staggering—for Iran, the United States, and the 
international community.  
The financial consequences of this agreement are extraordinary. As soon as the 
IAEA determines that Iran is complying with the agreement, Iran will immediately receive 
access to approximately fifty to sixty billion dollars,80 equal to roughly fourteen percent of 
                                                 
77 “The specific US laws and Executive Orders that will be terminated include the Iran Sanctions 
Act (P.L. 104-172 as amended); Section 1245(d)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
FY 2012 (P.L. 112-81); the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158); the 
Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (Subtitle D of P.L. 112-239); and the Comprehensive 
Iran Sanctions, Accountability; and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195), Executive 
Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, 13645, and sections 5-7 and 15 of EO 13628.”  
See Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr, “Iran Nuclear Agreement,” Congressional Research Service, 22 
July 2015, accessed 31 August 2015,   
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/pqpresultpage.gispdfhitspanel.pdflink/$2fapp-
bin$2fgis-congresearch$2f6$2fd$2fc$2ff$2fcrs-2015-fdt-
0508_from_1_to_31.pdf/entitlementkeys=1234|app-gis|congresearch|crs-2015-fdt-0508. 
78 The individuals and companies to be removed from the SDN List, the FSE List and the Non-SDN 
Iran Sanctions Act List are listed in Annex II, Section B of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. They 
have not been included in this document due to space constraints.  
79 Katzman and Kerr, “Iran Nuclear Agreement.” 
80 Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under Secretary of Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, in 
his written testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs stated 
the following:  
Estimates of total Central Bank of Iran (CBI) foreign exchange assets worldwide are in the range of 
$100 to $125 billion. Our assessment is that Iran’s usable liquid assets after sanctions relief will be 
much lower, at a little more than $50 billion.  The other $50-70 billion of total CBI foreign exchange 
assets are either obligated in illiquid projects (such as over 50 projects with China) that cannot be 
monetized quickly, if at all, or are composed of outstanding loans to Iranian entities that cannot 
repay them.  These assets would not become accessible following sanctions relief.  
See Adam J. Szubin, “"Written Testimony of Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under Secretary of Treasury for 
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, And Urban 
Affairs,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, 5 August 2015, accessed 31 August 2015, 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0144.aspx. 
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its GDP for the year 2014,81 and equivalent to the United States receiving a lump sum of 
nearly two and a half trillion dollars.82 With this, the limitations on Iran’s oil exports and 
petroleum products will be removed, allowing them to more than double their current 
exports and revenue.83 
Iran’s agreements under the JCPOA. According to Katzman and Kerr, in return 
for sanction relief, Iran has agreed to:  
 provide the IAEA with answers regarding the outstanding problems due to Iran’s 
non-compliance, and implement the IAEA’s Additional Protocol 
 limit their centrifuges used to enrich uranium to 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges for ten years 
 not enrich uranium-235 to levels past 3.67% for at least fifteen years 
 only enrich uranium at their Natanz facility, and not build any additional 
enrichment facilities for fifteen years 
 reduce their stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kilograms for at least 
fifteen years. Iran can sell, dispose of, or dilute the remaining LEU in their current 
stockpiles  
 convert the Fordow enrichment center into “a nuclear, physics, and technical 
centre” 
 stop research, development, and production of new centrifuges for at least ten years 
 redesign the Arak reactor so that it cannot produce weapons grade plutonium 84  
Should Iran violate these agreements, the JCPOA provides a complex mechanism for the 
reapplication of the previous sanctions.85 Additionally, “Iran stated that if sanctions are 
reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its 
commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.”86 These are the major terms of the 
JCPOA, to which both the United States and Iran agreed.  
                                                 
81 The GDP of Iran in 2014 was $415,338,504,536.30 according to the World Bank. See The World 
Bank, “GDP (current US$),” The World Bank, accessed 31 August 2015,  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. 
82 The GDP of the United States in 2014 was $17,419,000,000,000.00 according to the World Bank. 
See Ibid. 
83 Katzman and Kerr, “Iran Nuclear Agreement: Select Issues for Congress” 
84 Katzman and Kerr, “Iran Nuclear Agreement.” 
85 See the Dispute Resolution Mechanism, sections 36 and 37, on page 17 and 18 of the JCPOA. 
U.S. Department of State, “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” U.S. Department of State, accessed 26 
October 2015, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf. 
86 Ibid. 
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 The JCPOA grants Iran access to tens of billions of dollars, as well as the freedom 
to acquire much more through soon-to-be-licensed exports, but in exchange for severe, 
temporary limitations on their nuclear program. In this regard, the United States will 
remove economic sanctions, and support the UN’s abolishment of the Security Council 
resolutions and sanctions relative to Iran’s nuclear program.87 Aside from this, however, 
nothing else has changed, as the US sanctions against Iran for its human rights abuses, 
support of terrorism, and ballistic missile program remain untouched.88 Thus, the JCPOA 
proves to be a significant step towards potential partial reconciliation between Iran and the 
United States.  
Does Iran Demonstrate a Desire for Peace? 
 One major question posed by Senator Schumer was whether Iran actually wants 
peace and international reconciliation, or merely the financial benefit of sanctions relief. 
Iran’s motivation will greatly influence the direction US foreign policy should take. If Iran 
does not desire peace and reconciliation, there is little reason to make repeated overtures 
towards that end.  
 Essentially, Iran does not demonstrate an authentic desire for peace or 
reconciliation. While the Ayatollah was speaking to an Iranian crowd about standing up to 
the E3/EU+3 negotiators, the familiar “Death to America!” chants started. His reply was 
very telling as to Iran’s current perspective regarding the United States: “Of course yes, 
death to America, because America is the original source of this pressure.”89 The attitude 
expressed by the Ayatollah was hardly a desire for peace. What is even more revealing is 
that the Ayatollah’s public remarks were made in March of 2015, while the negotiations 
were underway.  
 Furthermore, only four days after the agreement was signed, Ayatollah Khamenei 
continued to publicly express hatred for the United States and desire for dissension. In his 
                                                 
87 This was accomplished with the 15 July 2015 submission of U.N.S.C. Resolution 2231, which 
was subsequently adopted on 20 July 2015. 
Ibid. 
88 Jacob J. Lew, “Testimony of Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on the Iran Nuclear Agreement,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, 23 July 2015, accessed 31 
August 2015, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0129.aspx. 
89 Times of Israel Staff, the AP, and AFP, “Khamenei Calls ‘Death to America’ as Kerry Hails 
Progress on Nuke Deal,” Times of Israel, 21 March 2015, accessed 31 August 2015, 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/khamenei-calls-death-to-america-as-kerry-hails-progress-on-nuke-deal/. 
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Eid al-Fitr90 sermon at Tehran’s Imam Khomeini Mosalla on 18 July, the Ayatollah made 
several revealing statements. He assured the congregation:  
whether this text is approved or not, we will not stop supporting our friends in the 
region: [we will continue to support] the oppressed nation of Palestine, the 
oppressed nation of Yemen, the Syrian nation and government, the Iraqi nation and 
government, the oppressed people of Bahrain, [and] the honest fighters of the 
resistance in Lebanon and Palestine; [these people] will be always supported by 
us.91 
In addition, the “honest fighters of the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine,” that 
the Ayatollah praises are groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Liberation Front, 
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, all of which are currently 
on the Department of State’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations list.92  
Later in his sermon, the Ayatollah remarked, “at any rate, our policy toward the 
arrogant government of America will not change a bit. As I have repeated frequently, we 
have no negotiation with America on different global and regional issues; we have no 
negotiation [with America] on bilateral issues . . . America’s policies in the region are 180 
degrees different from the policies of the Islamic Republic.”93 The Ayatollah very clearly 
expressed his disdain for the United States and an abject lack of interest in any form of 
reconciliation, and clarified Iran’s plans to continue religious, ideological, and financial 
support of terrorist organizations throughout the Middle East.  
 These sentiments are shared by Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, currently the 
chairman of the Assembly of Experts.94 Ayatollah Yazdi remarked to the eighteenth 
                                                 
90 “The Muslim holiday of Eid ul-Fitr (Arabic: رطفلا ديع, “festivity of breaking the fast”), sometimes 
spelled in English as Eid al-Fitr, marks the end of Ramadan and the beginning of the next lunar month 
called Shawwal in Arabic.” See ISNA, “Ramadan,” Islamic Society of North America, accessed 1 September 
2015, www.isna.net/ramadan.html. 
91 Sayyid Ali Khamenei, “The Leader’s Sermons in the Eid al-Fitr Congregational Prayers at 
Tehran’s Imam Khomeini Mosalla,” The Office of the Supreme Leader, 18 July 2015, accessed 1 September 
2015, http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=bayanat&id=13450. The brackets in this quote are from the 
translator and are contained in the original source. They do not represent any editing on the part of the author 
of this paper. 
92 U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, accessed 
1 September 2015, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
93 Khamenei, “The Leader’s sermons in the Eid al-Fitr congregational prayers at Tehran’s Imam 
Khomeini Mosalla.” The brackets in this quote are from the translator and are contained in the original source. 
They do not represent any editing on the part of the author of this paper. 
94 “The Assembly of Experts (also Assembly of Experts of the Leadership) of Iran, is a deliberative 
body of Mujtahids (Islamic theologians) that is charged with electing and removing the Supreme Leader of 
Iran and supervising his activities.” See IRNA, “Iran's Foreign Policy will not Change: Ayatollah Yazdi,” 
Islamic Republic News Agency, 1 September 2015, accessed 2 September 2015,  
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meeting of the Assembly on 1 September 2015 that “US crimes cannot be numbered and 
Iran sees [the] US as its first enemy.” He also insisted that the US goal of toppling the 
Islamic government of Iran would never be realized.95 
 Mohammad Reza Naqdi, the commander of the Basij paramilitary force in Iran, 
continued the public expression of Iran’s animosity against the United States in an 
interview with the al-Alam news agency on 31 August 2015. Referring to the thirty million 
strong Basij forces, Naqdi affirmed, “We all want battle with Oppression, we all support 
[the] people of Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan. Our enmity with [the] US is ideological and 
support of Oppressed people will continue.”96 He also stated that Iranian “hostility towards 
the US is profound and may not be resolved through talks.”97  
 Finally, Brigadier General Mohammad-Ali Jafari, commander of the powerful 
Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), expressed a similar attitude in a press 
conference on 1 September 2015. Speaking on Iranian defense strategies in light of the 
JCPOA, Jafari vocalized a distressing philosophy: “Our hostility towards the world 
arrogance [the United States] has not been lessened but the mechanism has changed and 
[is now] directed to the soft war.”98 Jafari is the fourth senior Iranian official in two months 
to publicly reaffirm the two main thrusts of Iranian foreign policy: opposition to the United 
States, and support of terrorist regimes and groups throughout the Middle East.  
Based on these statements, a prima facie case can undoubtedly be made that the 
ruling powers in Iran disdain the prospect of peace with the United States. The Supreme 
Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has vehemently denounced the possibilities of peace on 
multiple occasions, prior, and subsequent to, the signing of the agreement. The Assembly 
of Experts, the body in charge of selecting, overseeing, and if need be removing the 
Supreme Leader, is currently chaired by Ayatollah Yazdi, a hardliner who has publicly 
reiterated the sentiments of Ayatollah Khamenei. In addition, Yazdi, who was only recently 
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elected to the position in March of 2015,99 defeated the moderate former President Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani who was also running, and who had previously served as chairman of 
the Assembly of Experts from 2007 to 2011.100 Thus, Ayatollah Yazdi’s hardline 
viewpoints likely represent the perspective of a majority of the current members in the 
Assembly of Experts.  
Given that the senior leadership structure of Iran appears firmly opposed to 
reconciliation with the West, the chances of securing peace through the JCPOA are 
tenuous. Furthermore, the opposition of the IRGC and the Basij forces render any hopes of 
a major détente between Iran and the United States essentially impossible. Therefore, it can 
be stated with relative certainty that Iran is not interested in, nor actively pursuing, a 
reestablishment of peaceful relations with the United States. 
Iran’s Untrustworthy Character as a Nation 
 A final facet of Iran that must be evaluated is its character and trustworthiness as a 
nation. Can Iran be trusted to uphold agreements, especially nuclear agreements? Does Iran 
have a history of broken promises and lies? Answers to these questions are crucial in 
determining any policy towards Iran. If Iran cannot be trusted, then any agreement or policy 
the United States seeks with Iran must be crafted to confront that fact.  
 Examining Iran’s record at upholding signed agreements. Iran lacks a record 
of trust relative to agreements, especially those pertaining to its nuclear program. Though 
Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968,101 the IAEA officially determined Iran to 
be in non-compliance with the treaty on 24 September 2005,102 due to its long-standing 
failure to follow the stipulations of the Safeguards Agreement, as required under Article 
III of the treaty.103 In their resolution, the IAEA noted that, “Iran’s many failures and 
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breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement . . . constitute 
non compliance.”104 In addition, the IAEA also referenced the “history of concealment of 
Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director General’s report, the [unknown] nature 
of these activities, [the] issues brought to light in the course of the Agency’s verification 
of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of confidence 
that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.”105 This resolution 
demonstrated IAEA’s acknowledgement of Iran’s long-standing refusal to comply with the 
NPT. 106 
 The list of Iran’s violation of the NPT is substantial; however, upon closer 
examination, the situation is remarkably worse than it appears. Not only did Iran fail to 
report its actions to the IAEA, but it boldly lied when questioned about its various 
programs. For example, according to the official 2003 IAEA report, “in February 2003, 
Iran also acknowledged that the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran had 
been used for the production of centrifuge components, but stated that there had been no 
testing of these components involving the use of nuclear material, either at the Kalaye 
Electric Company or at any other location in Iran.” However, “in its letter of 21 October 
2003, Iran acknowledged that ‘a limited number of tests, using small amounts of UF6, [had 
been] conducted in 1999 and 2002’ at the Kalaye Electric Company.”107 This is a clear 
prima facie case of flagrant lying by Iranian officials in order to cover up the extent of their 
nuclear program. In the same report, the IAEA also noted that:  
                                                 
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by 
this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is 
being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. 
The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material 
in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried 
out under its control anywhere. 
See “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” 
104 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Resolution Adopted on 24 September 2005.” 
105 Ibid. 
106 As previously stated, Iran violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991 by importing uranium 
and failing to report it to the IAEA. Later, in 1994, Iran imported additional uranium metal, and again failed 
to acknowledge it. In 1999 and 2002, Iran conducted nuclear tests in secret, once again failing to declare this 
to the IAEA as required. Iran also built several nuclear facilities in secret, including ones to develop uranium 
and plutonium, and developed a laser spectroscopy laboratory, to refine low enriched uranium—all in secret. 
See IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 10 
November 2003. 
107 Ibid. 
IN SEARCH OF PEACE  29 
 
in a meeting with enrichment technology experts held during the 27 October–1 
November 2003 visit, Iranian authorities explained that the experiments that had 
been carried out at the Kalaye Electric Company had involved the 1.9 kg of 
imported UF6,
108 the absence of which the State authorities had earlier attempted to 
conceal by attributing the loss to evaporation due to leaking valves on the cylinders 
containing the gas.109  
Once again, the IAEA bluntly stated that Iran lied to them about both its actions and the 
extent of its nuclear program.  
 Iran continued to act in opposition to the IAEA and the international community, 
despite the discovery of its non-compliance with the NPT. In 2006, Iran resumed 
enrichment of uranium and manufacturing centrifuges in violation of the 2004 Paris 
Agreement.110 Iran also “stopped voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol in 
2006, and refused to answer satisfactorily the IAEA’s questions about past or ongoing 
experimentation on nuclear weaponization and the development of nuclear warheads for 
missile delivery systems.”111 Further, in September of 2009, the United States, United 
Kingdom, and France revealed the existence of another secret nuclear facility being 
constructed in Qom.112  
 In the nearly forty years since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has consistently 
breached signed agreements, and its multiple failures to inform the IAEA of its nuclear 
advances span more than a decade. When pressed for information on its program, it lied to 
the inspectors and the international community on several occasions, and possibly an 
additional, undisclosed number of times. Even after being confronted by the IAEA and the 
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UN Security Council, Iran continued to act with near total disregard of its agreements or 
international law. Based upon this evidence, it is obvious that Iran’s government fails to 
keep agreements, and cannot be trusted. This is especially relevant given the recently 
signed JCPOA.  
 Examining Iran’s support for international terrorism. Another vital aspect of 
Iran’s national character for policy makers to consider is its support for international 
terrorism. Iran is one of only three nations included on the Department of State’s list of 
State Sponsors of Terrorism,113 a place they have earned through decades of financial, 
logistical, and political support for terrorist groups worldwide, beginning with the Islamic 
Revolution itself. This fact alone should give those tasked with directing the future of the 
US relationship with Iran the greatest cause for concern.  
 A non-profit organization, United Against Nuclear Iran, compiled a list of terrorist 
attacks that Iran conducted, was involved with, or implicated in. The list is stunning in its 
breadth, beginning with the famous Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, and ending with the 
tour-bus bombing in Bulgaria in 2012.114 Due to the significance of Iran’s record of 
terrorism, and its impact upon US policy, it is imperative to include the complete record. 
Iran’s terrorism in the 1970s. On 4 November 1979, Iranian students overran the 
US Embassy in Tehran and took ninety members of the staff hostage. Thirty-seven 
hostages were released within two weeks, and another was released eight months later due 
to illness. However, fifty-two Americans remained in captivity in Iran for 444 days, finally 
being freed on 20 January 1981.115 
Iran’s terrorism in the 1980s. Iran was also complicit in a decade of kidnapping 
and terror in Lebanon between 1982 and 1992 through its support of Hezbollah. Ninety-
six individuals, including twenty-five American citizens, were kidnapped during the 
decade of terror, and several died in captivity for lack of adequate medical care, or from 
torture.116 Even though the kidnappings were conducted by Hezbollah in Lebanon, some 
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of the victims were transported to Iran and held in captivity there.117 That clearly indicates 
that Iran is culpable for at least some of the kidnappings.  
 On the afternoon of 18 April 1983, terrorists struck the US Embassy in Beirut in a 
devastating suicide bombing. The casualties included sixty-three dead and over one 
hundred wounded. Of the sixty-three deaths, seventeen were American citizens. The attack 
in Beirut was conducted by Hezbollah, and financed by Iran.118 A second suicide bombing 
occurred in Beirut on 23 October 1983 when an Iranian drove a truck laden with explosives 
into the US Marine Barracks, taking the lives of 241 US Marines, sailors, and soldiers, and 
injuring over one hundred more.119 The same day, another attack in Beirut took the lives 
of fifty-eight French soldiers.120  
 Later in 1983, Iranian-backed terrorist groups attacked again, this time in Kuwait. 
The bombing of the US Embassy in Kuwait resulted in five dead, and eighty-six 
wounded.121 In 1984, Hezbollah again attacked the United States, this time at the US 
Embassy Annex in East Beirut. Of the twenty-three people who died in the attack, two 
were American military personnel, and an additional seventy people were injured.122 Iran 
is largely believed to have assisted Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad in conducting the 
bombing.123 Continuing their decade of terror, Hezbollah hijacked TWA flight 847 on 14 
June 1985. Some of the 153 hostages were released within the first two days, but thirty-
nine were held for over two weeks. The only one of the hostages to become a casualty was 
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US Navy Petty Officer Robert Stethem, who unfortunately was murdered by the 
terrorists.124 
 On 13 July 1989, Iranian terrorists serving as Iranian diplomats allegedly 
assassinated Dr. Abdul-Rahman Ghassemlou, head of the Kurdish Democratic Party of 
Iran, while he was in Vienna. There is strong evidence from Austrian and Italian sources 
linking the assassination to Iran, and implicating the former president of Iran, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, as being personally involved.125  
Iran’s terrorism in the 1990s. Iran’s international assassinations continued with 
the murder of Shapour Bakhtiar on 8 August 1991. Bakhtiar, a secular politician, had been 
prime minister before the Islamic Revolution.126 A third assassination occurred on 17 
September 1992 at the Mykonos Café in Germany, when four Iranian Kurds were killed. 
In the aftermath, German courts found that Iran’s Committee for Special Operations, which 
claimed the membership of the president and Supreme Leader, had ordered the 
execution.127 
 Crossing the Atlantic Ocean, Iran continued spreading terrorism with the 17 March 
1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The attack, conducted 
by Iranian financed Hezbollah, resulted in twenty-nine dead and 242 injured.128 Iran’s 
terrorist activities in South America continued in 1994, with the 18 July AMIA Jewish 
community center bombing. The attack against the center, located in Buenos Aires, killed 
eighty-five people and injured hundreds.129 Six Iranians are currently wanted by 
INTERPOL for their role in the attack,130 including former Iranian Defense Minister 
Ahmad Vahidi.131  
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 On 25 June 1996, Iran and Hezbollah struck the United States again, this time in 
Saudi Arabia. The bombing of the Khobar Towers resulted in nineteen dead Americans, 
and an additional 372 injured.132 In 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft released a 
statement following the indictments relating to the bombing, indicating “that elements of 
the Iranian government inspired, supported, and supervised members of the Saudi 
Hizballah. In particular, the indictment alleges that the charged defendants reported their 
surveillance activities to Iranian officials, and were supported and directed in those 
activities by Iranian officials.”133  
Iran’s terrorism in the 2000s. In 2010, newly appointed US Ambassador to Iraq 
James Jeffrey estimated that “up to a quarter of the American casualties and some of the 
more horrific incidents in which Americans were kidnapped . . . can be traced without 
doubt to [the] Iranian groups.”134 Further, Iran is not only actively working against the US 
military in Iraq, but also providing funding to the Taliban in Afghanistan. News reports 
from 2010 detail how Iran pays Taliban fighters for killing American soldiers. For every 
soldier killed, Iran would pay $1,000, and for every destroyed vehicle the payment rose to 
$6,000.135 The individual interviewed in the report claimed he had collected over $77,000 
in blood money from Iran.136 
Iran’s terrorism in the 2010s. Iran’s brazen acts of terrorism continued to spread, 
and even reached the United States homeland in 2011. According to the Department of 
Justice, on 11 October 2011, “two individuals [were] charged in New York for their alleged 
participation in a plot directed by elements of the Iranian government to murder the Saudi 
Ambassador to the United States with explosives while the Ambassador was in the United 
States.”137 The plot was remarkable for several reasons. One is the outright boldness on the 
                                                 
132 FBI National Press Office, “Terrorism Charges Have Been Brought Against 13 Members of the 
Pro-Iran Saudi Hizballah,” The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 21 June 2001, accessed 4 September 2015, 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/terrorism-charges-have-been-brought-against-13-
members-of-the-pro-iran-saudi-hizballah. 
133 John Ashcroft, “Attorney General Statement,” The Department of Justice, 21 June 2001, accessed 
4 September 2015, http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2001/June/275ag.htm. 
134 Reuters, “US Iraq Deaths Due to Iran Groups: Envoy,” Al Arabia News, 17 October 2010, 
accessed 4 September 2015, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/08/27/117757.html. 
135 NBC, “Report: Iran Pays $1,000 for Each U.S. Soldier Killed by the Taliban,” NBC News, 5 
September 2010, accessed 4 September 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39014669/#.UqnzomRDvIw. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, “Two Men Charged in Alleged Plot to Assassinate 
Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States,” Department of Justice, 11 October 2011, accessed 4 
IN SEARCH OF PEACE  34 
 
part of Iran to attempt to assassinate a senior diplomat in a foreign country. Second, the 
plot involved the assistance of a drug cartel in Mexico,138 indicating the reach of Iranian 
terror.  
 On 13 and 14 February 2012, Iran attempted three coordinated attacks against 
Israeli diplomats worldwide. The first one in New Delhi, India, consisted of a car bomb 
that successfully detonated, but failed to kill the intended targets. Nevertheless, the wife of 
the Israeli defense attaché, who was in the vehicle, was seriously injured in the attack.139 
There were also connected, but unsuccessful, bombing attempts in Tbilisi, Georgia, and 
Bangkok, Thailand.140  
According to the UK Guardian’s reports, “police evidence, witness statements and 
court documents . . . plus interviews with local and international law enforcement and 
security officials, indicate that the attempted triple-bombing on 13 and 14 February was 
conducted by a well co-ordinated network of about a dozen Iranians and prepared over at 
least 10 months.”141 Additionally, the multinational investigation uncovered “at least 10 
Iranians allegedly involved in the plots, money transfers to key individuals from Iran, the 
use of Iranian phone connections and the flight following the attacks of conspirators to 
Iran.”142 This led one security official to remark, “The question is not was this Iran-backed 
or Iran-organised but who in Iran was running all this.”143  
In March of 2012, Iran again attempted to conduct terrorist attacks in foreign 
countries, this time in Azerbaijan. On 12 March 2012, it was reported that Azerbaijani 
officials arrested twenty-two individuals that they allege were hired by Iran to conduct 
attacks in the country. Their targets were primarily the US and Israeli embassies, but also 
additional targets with ties to the West.144 Later that year, terrorists successfully carried out 
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an attack against an Israeli tour bus in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian government blamed the 18 
July bombing in Burgas, Bulgaria, which killed five Israeli tourists and the Bulgarian bus 
driver, on Hezbollah and Iran.145 
According to the Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, “Iran’s 
state sponsorship of terrorism worldwide remained undiminished through the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), its Ministry of Intelligence and 
Security, and Tehran’s ally Hizballah.”146 Additionally, the report stated that “since the end 
of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has also assisted in rearming Lebanese 
Hizballah, in direct violation of UNSCR 1701.” Further, “Iran has provided hundreds of 
millions of dollars in support of Lebanese Hizballah in Lebanon and has trained thousands 
of its fighters at camps in Iran.” The report also mentions Iranian support for al-Qaida, their 
role in helping destabilize Iraq, their crucial support of the Assad regime in Syria, and their 
support of Palestinian terrorist groups. 147  
Finally, on 4 March 2014, Pete Hoekstra, former chairman of the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, and now a Sidllman Senior Fellow with the Investigative 
Project on Terrorism, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on 
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade; Middle East and North Africa. In his prepared 
statement, he listed forty-two countries worldwide where Iran either sponsored terrorism 
or has a significant outreach program in place.148 As Chairman Hoekstra remarked, the list 
is “breathtaking.” 149 
Iran’s untrustworthy character. As the foregoing record clearly demonstrates, 
Iran’s historic and current support for terrorist groups worldwide is well documented. 
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Therefore, the reality policy-makers face when attempting to craft US policy toward Iran 
is discouraging and virtually void of hope. Iran has consistently broken agreements and 
treaties it has signed, lied to international inspectors about its nuclear activities and 
intentions, and supported and conducted terrorist attacks worldwide. Any productive policy 
efforts must consider these realities, which unfortunately characterize Iran. 
Future Relations with Iran 
 It is important to remember, at this stage in the diplomatic process with Iran, that 
the United States should pursue peace with Iran as its main goal: peace between the United 
States and Iran, and between Iran and US allies in the Middle East. Contrary to common 
perceptions, this objective does not require Iran to embrace the United States as an ally, or 
vice versa. Peace translates into non-aggression, not Iranian compliance with US ideals. 
Thus, a successful solution could potentially involve little to no direct diplomatic 
communication or cooperation between Iran and the United States, provided there is de 
facto peace. Israel and Saudi Arabia’s relationship, while certainly imperfect, demonstrates 
how this type of peace could be accomplished without a full reconciliation diplomatically. 
 Israel and Saudi Arabia have never entertained formal diplomatic relations, yet they 
share common interests. Both want peace in the Middle East, albeit with different views 
on how to achieve it. Both are threatened by militant Islamic groups like ISIS, Hamas, and 
the Muslim Brotherhood, and both fear a powerful and nuclear-armed Tehran. Therefore, 
while Saudi Arabia and Israel are publicly enemies, in practice they often quietly support, 
or at least do not oppose, efforts towards their common objectives.150 Therefore, the current 
goal for developing US policy should be a similar sort of peace that does not require Iranian 
acquiescence to, and acceptance of, US ideals. 
Key Policy Considerations 
  In order to craft an effective US foreign policy that will lead towards such a peace, 
that policy must build upon seven components. To be successful, any policy that is 
developed regarding Iran must accomplish the following: 
 it must protect US security 
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 it must be realistic 
 it must acknowledge Iran’s national character 
 it must recognize Iran’s sovereignty as a nation-state 
 it must take into consideration regional concerns  
 it must be politically and internationally feasible 
 it must be clearly articulated 
These qualifiers must be the foundation for the future of the US relationship with Iran as 
the United States looks to implement the JCPOA and readjust foreign policy toward Iran. 
The first essential objective in US foreign policy is to protect US security at home 
and abroad. It would be an egregious abrogation of responsibility for policymakers to 
recommend a policy that failed to ensure the safety of the United States and its citizens. 
This not only requires the protection of the homeland, but also of citizens abroad, whether 
on official government business or otherwise. This criterion is the most important qualifier, 
and must be met in any policy put forward regarding Iran. 
The second criterion is that the policy must be realistic. Pushing for the total 
cessation of all nuclear technology, development, and power would guarantee that Iran 
could never develop a nuclear weapon. However, there is no practical way to enact that 
policy. Additionally, granting Iran everything they demand could go a long ways towards 
repairing the US-Iran relationship, but it is a completely unrealistic policy to pursue. 
The third requirement for any policy is that it accurately and honestly acknowledge 
Iran’s character as a nation. Iran has consistently supported terrorism and has demonstrated 
the desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Further, Iran has an extensive history of attempting 
to dominate the Middle East and spread the Islamic Revolution to the surrounding 
countries. Iran also actively seeks to threaten US regional allies, including Israel, Jordan, 
and Saudi Arabia. While these facts are not politically expedient, they represent the realities 
posed by Iran, and thus must be accounted for. 
Fourth, any policy must recognize that Iran is a sovereign nation-state, and as such, 
has the authority to enact policies and decisions without US approval. Within the bounds 
of international law, Iran has the authority to pursue what it may please, regardless of US 
consent. As much as it may frustrate members of the US political and diplomatic 
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community, Iran is free to oppose the United States in virtually any way it may choose, 
even through war. Any policy needs to be based upon an understanding of that fact.  
The fifth consideration, while significantly weaker than the first four, nonetheless 
is necessary for a successful policy. Anything the United States proposes regarding Iran 
will have major ramifications in the greater Middle East. Thus, any proposal must take into 
consideration the collateral consequences for the surrounding nations. The nation of Israel 
is the most obvious consideration; however, there are multiple other countries that demand 
consideration as well.  
Saudi Arabia, for example, is one of the most powerful Arab countries, given its 
massive oil reserves, and its status as caretaker of the two holiest cities in Islam. The 
Saudis’ religious, military, and economic influence in the region cannot be overlooked. 
Additionally, Saudi Arabia has been at odds with Iran for decades. Another regional power, 
which also happens to be a US ally, is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Currently 
relatively peaceful and stable, Jordan borders Syria and Iraq, which are both currently in 
the midst of immense internal turmoil and civil war, and Iran is encouraging violence 
within both countries. Therefore, it is crucial that any policy the United States develops 
takes into consideration all of the regional implications.  
Sixth, to be successful, the policy recommendation must be politically and 
internationally feasible, and supported by members of both political parties. In addition, 
while the United States is not bound by the constraints of notoriously fickle international 
opinion, it still must consider the international implications of any policy. For example, 
any effort to place additional UN sanctions on Iran requires, at a bare minimum, the support 
of the Permanent Members of the Security Council. While the UK and France tend to be 
of a similar policy-mindset as the United States, both China and Russia are infamously 
opposed to many US policy goals. Therefore, in order to have any lasting effectiveness, 
any policy proposal towards Iran must have as wide of an international appeal as possible. 
 Finally, any policy recommendation must be clearly articulated. Without a clearly 
defined policy, decision makers are left to either create policy ad hoc, or function in a 
purely reactionary manner. In addition, a well-developed policy must be clearly 
enumerated so that it can be presented and discussed prior to adoption. A lack of clarity 
would prove disastrous to the success of any foreign policy recommendation. 
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Three US-Iran Policy Proposals   
 Optimistic embrace of the JCPOA. There are three types of proposed responses 
to the JCPOA which the United States could adopt. The first is to declare the deal an 
overwhelming success. The Obama administration is taking this path, and President Obama 
is throwing his full weight behind the deal. According to the official White House page on 
the JCPOA, “after many months of principled diplomacy, the P5+1 — the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and Germany — along with the European 
Union, have achieved a long-term comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran that will verifiably 
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will 
be exclusively peaceful going forward.”151 Proponents of this policy brim with overflowing 
optimism that peace has once again been restored to the Middle East and the problem of a 
nuclear Iran has been resolved.  
 However, this attitude fails at least three of the seven criteria. First, it fails to 
adequately protect US security; second, it fails to take into consideration Iran’s proven 
character; and third, it fails to comprehend regional concerns and realities. It is abundantly 
clear that the JCPOA alone will not resolve the longstanding issues posed by Iran. 
Criterion 1: US national security. The JCPOA places strict constraints on Iran’s 
nuclear development capabilities, but only for a maximum of fifteen years, after which 
time Iran will be better positioned to develop nuclear weapons, should they choose to. Once 
the fifteen years expire, the United States will have very little influence over Iran, placing 
it at a great disadvantage should Iran choose to escalate hostilities. This is a serious strategic 
security lapse. 
 According to US Treasury estimates, it will take Iran until 2022 to rebuild its 
economy, even with sanctions relief.152 Unfortunately, that is only half way through the 
fifteen years of restrictions. Thus, Iran has approximately seven to eight years to build their 
economy to the point of supporting a nuclear program once the restrictions end. 
Additionally, Iran has fifteen years free of sanctions in order to establish financial 
                                                 
151 White House “The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon” The 
White House, accessed 5 September 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal. 
152 Adam J. Szubin, “"Written Testimony of Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under Secretary of Treasury 
for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, And Urban 
Affairs.” 
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relationships with countries such as Russia and China, which have a long history of 
rejecting US influence. If Iran capitalizes on this opportunity, it could reach the end of the 
restrictions with a strong economy, strong economic ties to countries that oppose US 
foreign policy, and no restrictions on nuclear development. The risks posed by that scenario 
would be astronomical. 
Criterion 3: Iran’s national character. Additionally, this policy utterly fails to take 
into consideration the nature of Iran, such as Iran’s history of lying and deceit. As 
previously demonstrated, Iran has repeatedly proven untrustworthy, and thus it would be 
sheer foolishness to blindly trust in any sort of hoped-for character transformation. This is 
especially relevant given the antagonistic statements that various members of Iran’s 
leadership have made after the JCPOA was signed. 
Further, this naïvely optimistic attitude towards Iran does not take into 
consideration the difference in politics between the United States and Iran. The current 
Supreme Leader of Iran has been in power since he was appointed in 1990,153 meaning that 
he has ruled Iran through seven successive US presidential administrations, reaching back 
to the administration of George H. W. Bush who was president from 1989-1993. By the 
time the fifteen-year restrictions end for Iran, there will have been almost four full 
additional US presidential administrations. It is possible that the current Ayatollah will still 
be ruling Iran in fifteen years, as he is only seventy-six. Even if he were to pass away, it is 
highly probable that there will only be one change of leadership in the next fifteen years.  
This continuity of leadership and control is completely foreign to the US political 
perspective. Thus, any hopes that a new political environment will emerge in the next 
fifteen years is grounded in wishful policy-thinking. It is possible that the next decade could 
witness a “new” Iran, but with over thirty-five years of history as precedent, the balance of 
probability leans strongly against it.  
Criterion 5: Regional concerns. Finally, this policy virtually ignores the concerns 
of regional nations, most evident in Israel’s efforts to lobby against the deal. In his speech 
to the seventieth General Assembly of the United Nations, the Prime Minister of Israel, 
Benjamin Netanyahu, excoriated the international community for their support of the 
                                                 
153 Office of the Supreme Leader, “Biography,” The Office of the Supreme Leader, accessed 5 
September 2015, http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=bio. 
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JCPOA. He forcefully stated that the “deal doesn't make peace more likely. By fueling 
Iran’s aggressions with billions of dollars in sanctions relief, it makes war more likely.” He 
continued:  
Every few weeks, Iran and Hezbollah set up new terror cells in cities throughout 
the world. Three such cells were recently uncovered in Kuwait, Jordan and Cyprus. 
In May, security forces in Cyprus raided a Hezbollah agent’s apartment in the city 
of Larnaca. There they found five tons of ammonium nitrate, that’s roughly the 
same amount of ammonium nitrate that was used to blow up the federal building in 
Oklahoma City. And that’s just in one apartment, in one city, in one country. But 
Iran is setting up dozens of terror cells like this around the world, ladies and 
gentlemen, they’re setting up those terror cells in this hemisphere too.154 
Prime Minister Netanyahu also firmly indicated, “Israel will do whatever it must do to 
defend our state and to defend our people.”155 
 While Saudi Arabia had a more muted response to the JCPOA, the official 
statement was cool at best. An official Saudi source said, “Saudi Arabia has always been 
in favor of an agreement between Iran and the P 5+1 Group that would prevent Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon. The agreement must include a specific, strict and sustainable 
inspection regime of all Iranian sites, including military sites, as well as a mechanism to 
swiftly re-impose effective sanctions in the event that Iran violates the agreement.” Even 
more revealing was that:  
Saudi Arabia agrees with the P5+1 Group and the international community in 
continuing the sanctions on Iran for its support of terrorism and its violations of 
international arms treaties. Under the nuclear deal, Iran has to use its resources for 
domestic development and to improve the living conditions of its people rather than 
use it to incite turmoil in the region, which would only be met with harsh and 
determined responses from the countries of the region.156   
The serious concerns of both Saudi Arabia and Israel are evident in their statements 
regarding the JCPOA. All told, this naïvely optimistic policy recommendation fails three 
of the essential criteria, and therefore should not be pursued, even though the JCPOA has 
been signed. 
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156 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, “Saudi Statement on Iran Nuclear Deal,” 14 July 2015, accessed 
2 October 2015, https://www.saudiembassy.net/latest_news/news07141501.aspx. 
IN SEARCH OF PEACE  42 
 
Total rejection of the JCPOA. In contrast to President Obama’s confident 
optimism, others take a markedly different perspective on the deal. For example, the 
organization Jihad Watch called the JCPOA “a looming disaster for the free world” and “a 
gift to the Ayatollah, ensuring a future of blood and ruin.”157 This sentiment is shared 
among many of the current members of Congress, and especially those of the Republican 
Party.  
When the deal came before Congress, not a single Republican in the House or 
Senate voted in favor of it. In the House, the vote was 269 opposed to 162 in favor, with 
one “present” vote by a Republican. Additionally, twenty-five Democrats joined the 
Republicans in rejecting the deal.158  In the Senate, all fifty-four Republicans were joined 
by four Democrats, including the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD), in opposing the deal.159 However, due to the 
terms of the Corker bill160, their opposition was not enough to prevent its enactment. Most 
opponents continue to advocate various forms of total rejection of the deal, coupled with 
either a continuation of sanctions or an increase. While this perspective accurately 
identifies the weaknesses of the deal, it fails regarding two of the criteria. 
Criterion 2: Is it realistic? Completely doing away with the JCPOA and attempting 
to re-negotiate another deal with Iran would be virtually impossible. Now that the 
implementation of the deal has begun, it would be extremely difficult to reject it and re-
impose the sanctions. Realistically speaking, the only way that this could be accomplished 
would be by a change in the membership of the Senate and Presidency. Nevertheless, the 
deal will have been in place for almost sixteen months before that is scheduled to occur, 
greatly increasing the difficulty of rejecting it. Further, reapplication of the sanctions likely 
would not be enough. Rather, there would need to be an increase in sanctions in order to 
force Iran to re-negotiate, and even in that case, the likelihood of success is minimal. 
Criterion 6: Is it feasible internationally? It is essential to remember that the 
JCPOA was a joint deal, not just a US-Iran deal. France, Germany, the UK, Russia, and 
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China all negotiated and signed it as well. Thus, if the United States were to attempt to 
retroactively reject the deal, there would likely be no international support. Additionally, 
the United States, acting alone, is not capable of influencing Iran in a significant way short 
of declaring war. Lured by lucrative business opportunities, the other members of the 
E3/EU+3, to say nothing of the international community at large, would be completely 
disinterested in throwing out the deal they negotiated. Even though this option recognizes 
the threats posed by Iran, it fails the test of feasibility and would be unproductive to pursue.    
Distrust Iran, verify its compliance, and support regional allies. There is, 
however, a third option. Borrowing from President Reagan’s approach to the Soviet Union, 
the United States could pursue a policy of distrust and verification, which would best 
satisfy the seven requirements for a successful foreign policy. It would ensure US security 
more successfully by holding Iran to its agreements, and doubly verifying its adherence. 
Since Iran is not trustworthy, Iranian claims of compliance cannot be treated as accurate, 
necessitating independent verification.  
Criteria evaluation. This policy is realistic in that it addresses the weaknesses of 
the JCPOA, while also acknowledging that it has been signed, and that the United States 
has agreed to abide by it. Iran’s sovereignty is respected, as is its ability to act in opposition 
to the United States. However, its ability to break its agreements, which it has repeatedly 
done, would be hampered by US verification. This would also address regional concerns, 
especially those of Israel.  
Finally, a policy of distrust of Iran, yet providing it the opportunity to prove 
trustworthy, would be internationally feasible, as verification would only ensure that the 
agreement succeeds. This is in the best interests of the international community. 
Additionally, the stated distrust in the policy would likely find support in the majority of 
Congress that voted against the deal in September of 2015. Finally, in order to 
accommodate the final qualification, any policy recommendation must be clearly 
articulated.  
Steps for application of the recommended policy. Former State Department 
official Robert Einhorn161 proposed six policies that could be enacted in the effort to ensure 
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the success of the JCPOA.162 Taking aspects of his six recommendations, and adding a 
seventh, creates seven clear steps to a practical application of a policy of Distrust and 
Verify:  
 Step 1: Build international support for enforcement and Iranian compliance 
 Step 2: Prioritize detection of Iranian weaponization efforts 
 Step 3: Identify nuclear activities that have no plausible peaceful justification 
 Step 4: Share pertinent intelligence with the IAEA and E3/EU+3 
 Step 5: Enforce current UNSC resolutions against Iran’s missile program 
 Step 6: Remain vigilant against Iran’s funding of terrorism 
 Step 7: Increase proactive support for US allies in the region 
Taken together, these seven steps form the basis for a coherent, realistic policy towards 
Iran. 
Step 1: Build international support for enforcement and Iranian compliance. 
Though the JCPOA has been signed, and is in the process of being implemented, there are 
stringent parameters that Iran must meet, or risk the reapplication of all the former 
sanctions. Both the current administration and Congress should work with the E3/EU+3 to 
ensure that Iran will be held to its agreements. The United States should publicly make it 
very clear that it will not tolerate any violation or deviation from the JCPOA, and build 
international support for strict enforcement, to ensure the success of the JCPOA for at least 
the next fifteen years. 
Step 2: Prioritize detection of Iranian weaponization efforts. In order to make Step 
1 effective, Step 2 should be immediately implemented. This will ensure that Iran’s nuclear 
program is solely peaceful, as they have committed, and place Iran into the same category 
                                                 
Robert Einhorn is a senior fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and 
the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, both housed within the Foreign 
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policies.  
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as the other thirty-two countries with active nuclear technology that cause no international 
apprehension.163 Since the danger is the weaponization of nuclear technology, not the 
possession of it, the United States should actively seek to detect Iranian weaponization 
technology and development. This policy respects Iran’s right to have nuclear technology 
as outlined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, yet addresses the risks posed by a nuclear Iran.  
Step 3: Identify nuclear activities that have no plausible peaceful justification. Step 
3 ties neatly in with Step 2. The United States should identify specific actions that have no 
plausible, peaceful justification and make it official policy that it views these actions as a 
violation of the JCPOA. Should any of these actions be detected, the United States could 
then declare Iran in violation and work to reapply the sanctions as laid out in the JCPOA. 
These actions would include things such as the production of highly enriched uranium or 
plutonium, any activity towards weaponization, as well as any grievous failure by Iran to 
report its activities to the IAEA as mandated by the Safeguards Agreement. 
Step 4: Share pertinent intelligence with the IAEA and E3/EU+3. Step 4 builds on 
the previous three steps to ensure that any breaches of the JCPOA will be addressed 
accordingly. The United States should make sure that the IAEA has the necessary 
intelligence to adequately assess Iran’s nuclear program. Additionally, should a violation 
occur, the United States should work to make certain that the IAEA and E3/EU+3 have 
enough detailed intelligence to recognize and respond to that breach. This can be done by 
tasking the US intelligence community to detect Iranian failure to comply with the JCPOA. 
Additionally, Congress and the intelligence community should immediately work to 
establish the proper information channels to relay pertinent US intelligence information to 
the E3/EU+3 and IAEA, instead of waiting until a breach occurs.  
Step 5: Enforce current UNSC resolutions against Iran’s missile program. Step 5 
will address several concerns simultaneously. First, it will help ensure US security, and 
second, it will help ensure peace in the Middle East. Additionally, strict enforcement of 
current sanctions will reassert the authority of the UN, remind Iran that the JCPOA does 
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not resolve the international community’s opposition to their non-nuclear violations, and 
reassert the fact that the United States can be a powerful foe should Iran attempt to violate 
the agreement. 
Step 6: Remain vigilant against Iran’s funding of terrorism. Step 6, in conjunction 
with the previous five steps, will help attain the larger goal of peace in the Middle East. By 
doubling down on fighting the funding of terrorism, the United States can seek to mitigate 
the risks that the financial benefits Iran receives under the JCPOA will be channeled 
towards terrorism. This satisfies the larger goal of regional peace, as well as acknowledging 
the reality of Iran’s history of supporting terrorism. Congress can work to pass laws that 
place sanctions on those who aid or finance terror, freeze assets of known supporters of 
terror, and strengthen existing anti-terror policies. Additionally, the United States should 
pressure the international community to work to stop the funding of terror worldwide.  
Step 7: Increase proactive support for US allies in the region. Finally, Step 7 will 
seek to counteract any increase in influence Iran might gain due to the JCPOA. By actively 
working to support US allies in the Middle East, it will signal to Iran that the United States 
is not abandoning the region, and help reassure allies that are threatened by Iran. Step 7 
can include military cooperation such as joint training exercises and drills, economic 
cooperation like trade agreements and investments in national companies, or even 
educational cooperation like student exchange programs.  
Additionally, Step 7 would involve opposing Iran’s inflammatory rhetoric against 
Israel and the West. No nation should call for the destruction of another nation and not be 
soundly rebuked for it by the international community. The United States should take these 
obvious, concrete steps to indicate a continued, or even increased, alliance with dependable 
allies in the Middle East.  
Conclusion 
While the US-Iran relationship likely will not see any significant improvement 
following the JCPOA, there is the potential for peace moving forward. Policy makers 
should be content with achieving a status of non-aggression with Iran, rather than full 
diplomatic reconciliation. Unfortunately, Iran and the United States share a long history of 
distrust and suspicion. This stems mainly from Iran’s three decades of global terrorism 
beginning with the hostage crisis in 1979 and its repeated violations of international 
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agreements with its nuclear program, as well as the various interventions that the United 
States has made in the region. Regrettably, this long history casts a long shadow over the 
current relationship between the two countries. 
 After three decades of continual roadblocks, the biggest opportunity for diplomatic 
progress came in the form of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This agreement 
set up a framework for the removal of the economic sanctions placed on Iran by the UN 
Security Council, and attempts to ensure the Iran’s nuclear program will be solely peaceful 
in nature. While the JCPOA is not widely supported in the United States, or among US 
allies in the Middle East, it was accepted by all the parties, and implementation began in 
late 2015. The JCPOA is definitely flawed, yet it currently forms the framework for a 
significant portion of the US-Iran relationship today, and thus any policy must work from 
that foundation.  
 Three different strategies have been proposed that attempt to direct US foreign 
policy in relation to Iran. The first, an optimistic embrace of the JCPOA, falls woefully 
short upon closer examination. This policy fails to adequately ensure US security, it fails 
to acknowledge Iran’s history of terrorism, and it ignores many of the concerns of the other 
countries in the region. The second option, outright rejection of the JCPOA, fails a test of 
feasibility. While recognizing the shortcomings of the JCPOA and attempting to address 
them, this policy alternative has virtually no chance of success. To begin with, the JCPOA 
will have been implemented for over a year before there is any possibility of rejection by 
the United States, and secondly, this proposal will have virtually no support internationally. 
This would leave the United States in the uncomfortable position of backing out of a major 
international agreement over a year after it had approved that very agreement. Therefore, 
while it may appear to be a good alternative, this policy ultimately proves deeply flawed 
and should not be pursued.  
Finally, a strategy of distrusting Iran, yet giving them the opportunity to prove 
trustworthy, is proposed as the best plan of action. This policy of distrust and verify can be 
accomplished through seven specific policy recommendations, which if enacted, form a 
clear pathway to success. The seven steps work to strengthen the existing JCPOA, and 
develop a cohesive foreign policy that extends beyond the text of the agreement. 
Additionally, these steps look to ensure not just US peace with Iran, but peace in the Middle 
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East as a whole. Therefore, while this alternative keeps the seriously flawed JCPOA in 
force, it offers the best path forwards for the United States to take in order to secure lasting 
peace. 
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